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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 19/04/2006

Accident number: 55

Accident time: 08:50

Accident Date: 21/10/1997

Where it occurred: Luena/Lucusse road,
Moxico Province

Country: Angola

Primary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)

Class: Missed-mine accident
ID original source: GP/JJ/GI

Date of main report: 07/11/1997
Name of source: INAROEE

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: Type 72 AP blast

Ground condition: hard
route (verge)

Date record created: 23/01/2004

Date last modified: 17/03/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: Leua

Map series:
Map sheet: 219

Map edition:
Map name: 1:100 000

Accident Notes
inadequate metal-detector (?)
inadequate communications (?)
inadequate medical provision (?)
inconsistent statements (?)
safety distances ignored (?)
pressure to work quickly (?)
inadequate area marking (?)
metal-detector not used (?)
inadequate training (?)
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Accident report
The demining group appear to have been operating in two-man teams at the time but the
accident report implies that both team members were working simultaneously.
An undated report of a country MAC board of inquiry was made available and the following
summarises its content.
The investigators visited the site on 4th November 1997 and found the deminers clearing a 2m
wide verge on both sides of the road. They observed that the deminers were clearing without
using marking sticks and at a distance of only 6 metres apart. The victim and his partner
began work at 07:30. By 08.50 they had cleared 502 metres. Both men wore frag-jackets,
helmet and visor. The victim was clearing by using his prodder. He was called to help his
Section Leader remove grass from a large pothole in the road. As he returned at 08:50 he
stepped on "a mine he had previously missed". No fragments of the device were found and
the mine identification relied on inference from the damage inflicted. No record of the time
taken for medical treatment was made.
Communications within the demining team by UHF handsets was unreliable. They were
unable to report the accident until the victim had travelled 34k towards the "Operations
Room".
The victim and his partner stated that the Section Leader had told them to stop using the
detector. "Faced with the inability to prod correctly" they argued but were overruled. The
Section Leader said there were no mines and they must work quicker. When they ran out of
marking sticks, he told them to keep working. They said the Section Leader had left to spend
20 minutes drinking "Hidromel" (fermented honey alcohol).
The Section Leader denied the victim and his partner's statement. He could not remember
the number of deminers under his control, what time they had started work or the amount of
area cleared. [The investigation took place two weeks after the accident.] He claimed to be
unaware that the deminers were clearing a 2m wide lane without markers despite being only
2m from them. He also claimed to have completed the demining group's Section Leader's
course but the group denied holding any such courses.
The Team Supervisor stated that he was warned the Section Leader about drinking
previously.
The paramedic acknowledged that he was poorly equipped and stated that he had asked for
better provisions in writing twice following the accident. He had not received special trauma
training. When questioned about the content of his First Aid bag it contained a single used
pair of surgical gloves, an aluminium foil blanket that he thought was a pressure bandage,
and no trauma kit.
The investigators determined that demining was not being conducted in line with the demining
group's SOPs and identified the following (quoted verbatim) failings:
i) "The deminers were clearing a two metre wide lane.
ii) They were working without lane markings.
iii) The No.2 and the Section LEader were too close to the working No.1.
iv) The deminers involved were not using a mine-detector without good reason.
v) The deminers were not able to use the prodder correctly due to the hardness of the earth.
vi) The demining was being carried out too quickly (1.3 metres per minute).
vii) When the No.2 walked into the cleared lane he did not observe the safety distance
between himself and the No.1.
viii) [Demining group] SOPs contain a paragraph that instructs staff to refuse to work [if] they
are ordered to carry out a task that does not comply with [Demining group] safety regulations.
Neither the No.1 or the No.2 complied with this paragraph."
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Conclusion
The investigators concluded that "the actions and lack of action of the Section Leader are
considered to be both neglectful and constitute gross misconduct…he bullied them into
disobeying…SOPs". Safety equipment did not help because "the explosion was relatively
small". Alcohol had affected the actions of the Section Leader. There was not good reason for
failing to use a metal detector and the hardness of the ground made the use of a prodder
"correctly" impossible. Demining was being carried out "too quickly".
There was a "high infestation of flies" that became "almost unbearable". "This may well have
contributed to the clearance methods and the speed of the demining operation." The
Operations Room did not keep a log after communication was established. The first aid kit
was "inadequate". They concluded that "had the casualty sustained more serious injuries it is
difficult to imagine how he could have stabilised the casualty".

Recommendations
The investigators recommended that staff must refuse to obey an order that breaches SOPs
and that when a Supervisor cannot easily get to a demining location, work must stop. They
further recommended that the demining group must stop all demining until they have
adequate paramedic supplies and that no demining should take place without adequate
communications. Other recommendations included that the Supervisors and Section Leaders
should report breaches of SOP immediately, that the group should carry out refresher courses
for all staff, including paramedics, and should also "formulate and implement" training
courses for supervisors and section leaders. They added that the Section Leader involved in
the accident must be disciplined.

Victim Report
Victim number: 75

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: 40 minutes

Protection issued: Frag jacket

Protection used: Frag jacket, Helmet,
Short visor

Helmet
Short visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Hands
minor Legs
AMPUTATION/LOSS
Leg Below knee
COMMENT
See medical report.
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Medical report
No medical report was made available: see Accident report.
The victim's injuries were considered light, from which I infer that his amputation was "below
the knee".
Minor hand and leg injuries were later reported by one of the group’s Technical Advisors.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Management/control inadequacy" because
the unapproved actions of the field supervisor appear to have led directly to the accident.
Responsibility for the selection, training and control of field supervisors lies higher in the
management chain. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training” because the
supervisor appears not to have known how to do his job.
The accident report illustrates several management failings that could have had far-reaching
consequences if the accident has involved a larger device. The demining group involved was
a specialist NGO of long-standing, making it hard to excuse the compound management
errors exhibited in this accident.
The time lapse between the accident and its investigation and the failure to record any
attempt to identify the device are failures of the country MAC's investigation procedure that
are not explained.

Related papers
A letter from the country MAC to the demining group was on file. It recorded an agreement for
the demining group to increase "immediately" safety distances from 20 to 25 meters, increase
the "soak-time" after a "mis-fire" from 10 to 30 minutes, and other (unspecified) minor SOP
changes.
In this letter it was noted that the demining group did carry out refresher courses for
paramedics, but not deminers. The letter ended with the recorded opinion that the demining
groups' "demining operations are carried out in a professional manner and are to a high
overall standard".
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